Abstract Literature about the significance of cultivating democratic citizenship education in universities abounds. However, very little has been said about the importance of friendship in sustaining democratic communities. In this article I argue for a complementary view of friendship based on mutuality and love-with reference to the seminal ideas of Sherman and Derrida. My view is that teaching and learning ought to be used as pedagogical spaces to nurture forms of friendship which not only encourage mutuality but also love in order to make possible the taking of risks on the part of students and teachers. And, if teachers and students act with mutuality and love they would be more favourably positioned in their society to take risks and to enact democratic justice.
Introduction
To begin with, Benhabib (2002, p. 169) argues that democracy and citizenship can co-exist because the former frames education as a process of active consent and participation, whereas the latter designates the sense of belonging that people demonstrate when socialised into educative practices. Active participation and belonging are both conceptually connected to some form of engagement in relation to someone else-I participate with others in a conversation, so I engage with them; and I belong to a group where members are in conversation with one another, so I engage with them by being attached to the conversation. On the one hand, by active participation Benhabib (2002, pp. 133-134) means that people are free and equal moral beings who attempt to influence each others' opinions by engaging in a public dialogue in which they examine and critique (in a civil and considerate manner) each other's positions, while explaining reasons for their own. On the other hand, by belonging is meant that people are committed to the task of education through being more accountable to the process and deepening their attachment to it. Moreover, for Benhabib democratic citizenship education (more specifically, educating people to become democratic citizens) would at least be constituted by three interrelated aspects: collective identity, privileges of membership, and social rights and benefits.
Firstly, educating people to be democratic citizens has to take into account people's linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious commonalities (Benhabib 2002, p. 162) . The idea of finding a civil space for the sharing of different people's commonalities is based on the understanding that people need to learn to live with the otherness of others whose ways of being may be deeply threatening to our own (Benhabib 2002, p. 130) . And, by creating a civil space, referred to by Benhabib (2002, p. 127) as 'intercultural dialogue', whereby people can enact what they have in common and at the same time make public their competing narratives and significations, people might have a real opportunity to co-exist. In this way they would not only establish a community of conversation and interdependence (that is, they share commonalities), but also one of disagreement (that is, they do not share commonalities) without disrespecting others' life-worlds (Benhabib 2002, pp. 35 and 41) . Put differently, when people are engaged in a conversation underpinned by interdependence and disagreement, they engage in an educative process with a collective identity-they share commonalities. And educating people to become democratic citizens involves creating civil spaces whereby they can learn to share commonalities and to respect the differences of others.
Secondly, educating people to be democratic citizens involves making them aware of the right of political participation, the right to hold certain offices and perform certain tasks, and the right to deliberate and decide upon certain questions (Benhabib 2002, p. 162) . The point is that people need to be educated to accept that they cannot be excluded from holding certain positions or performing certain tasks on the basis of their cultural differences. They have the right to participate, to be heard and to offer an account of their reasons 'within a civil public space of multicultural understanding and confrontation' (Benhabib 2002, p. 130) . Of particular importance to this essay is the notion of educating people about the right to deliberate and decide on certain questions. What this implies is that we should recognise the right of people capable of speech and action to be participants in the moral conversation whereby they should have the same rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for justification of the presuppositions of the conversation (Benhabib 2002, p. 107) . Only then do people become participants in an educative process underpinned by democratic citizenship.
Thirdly, democratic citizenship education also involves educating people about their civil, political and social rights. Such a process would educate people about the rights to protection of life, liberty and property, the right to freedom of conscience, and certain associational rights, such as those of contract and marriage-all civil rights. People would also be educated about the rights of self-determination, to hold and run for office, to enjoy freedom of speech and opinion, and to establish political and non-political associations, including a free press and free institutions of science and culture-that is, political rights. And they are educated about the right to form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, health care rights, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, child care, housing and educational subsidies-that is, social rights (Benhabib 2002, pp. 163-164) .
In essence, following Benhabib, a democratic citizenship education aims to cultivate public pedagogical spaces (in associational and non-associational networks such schools, universities, religious sites and clubs) whereby people can be educated about one another's shared commonalities and to respect cultural differences (where culture represents people's shared values, meanings, linguistic signs and symbols). A democratic citizenship education would also educate people to deliberate in such a way as to offer an account of one's reasons and in turn listen to the reasons of others, and to recognise and respect people's civil, political and social rights. An education which takes into account these issues is underpinned by democracy and citizenship.
Over the last two decades some of the leading-edge contributions in defence of a liberal conception of education commensurate with the afore-mentioned account of democratic citizenship have been offered by Greene (1995) , Nussbaum (1997) , MacIntyre (1999) and Gutmann (2003) . In Releasing the imagination, Greene (1995) makes a cogent argument for education as a way of connecting with others in order for people to develop high levels of democratic action which would enable them to function dialogically as citizens in their societies; Nussbaum (1997) , in Cultivating humanity, calls for people to become responsive to others in the sense of harnessing their democratic qualities as citizens; MacIntyre (1999) , in Dependent rational animals, argues that people should become practical reasoners who have the capacity to cultivate conversational and political (democratic) justice in relation to other citizens; and Gutmann (2003) , in Democracy and identity, expresses the view that democratic justice in societies would wane as soon as injustice (through unlimited freedom of speech) towards other citizens begins. Most recently, and specifically related to democratic justice and educational activities, Enslin et al. (2003) made a strong case for a communicative form of deliberative democracy as a way to engender more inclusive teaching and learning practices in classrooms.
What interests me more, and of specific relevance to nurturing teaching and learning, is an Aristotelian idea of friendship which White (1998) considers as important to sustaining a democratic community. White (1998, pp. 82-83) argues that self-respecting citizens intent on cultivating a democratic community cannot ignore the mutual values of trust, confidence, care, openness, sharing, loyalty and support towards one another-all constitutive features of friendship. In as much as White's argument in defence of friendship in education advances the democratic citizenship debate on teaching and learning, it seems to be biased towards a form of mutuality based on intimacy and commitment towards one another-one which seems to be silent on the taking of risks, which is so important in fostering democratic citizenship through teaching and learning. To my mind, friendship cannot merely be about nurturing intimate relations without some sort of risk taking, otherwise such relations would merely result in carefully contrived 'policed' activities where the possibility of vehemently disagreeing with one's friends becomes highly unlikely.
In this article I shall show how both Sherman's (1997) and Derrida's (1997) ideas of friendship can be used to nurture teaching and learning which involve taking risks. My argument in defence of taking risks through friendships is hopefully a move away from fostering deliberative democratic interactions among teachers and students, which could potentially ignore forms of action which involve challenging, undermining and disagreeing with one's friends.
Friendship and Mutuality
Sherman's (1997) Aristotelian account of friendship seems to be more compelling in developing forms of teaching and learning which connect plausibly with democratic citizenship education. Firstly, friendship can take the form of mutual attachment-a matter of doing things together-where both teachers and students demonstrate a willingness to give priority to one another I terms of time and resources. In other words, when teaching and learning take place, both teachers and students avoid being dismissive of one another, that is, they listen with interest and appreciation to one another. In this way, the possibility that they correct one another as well as learning from the strengths of wisdom of one another in an atmosphere of trust, goodwill and mutual benefit are enhanced (Sherman 1997, pp. 206-207) . When students and teachers attend to one another with interest and appreciation in an atmosphere of non-dismissiveness, they care for one another in such a way that both their potentialities are evoked. For instance, when students produce arguments, they are not afraid of being corrected by teachers and other students. They are also not concerned that their judgements would be dismissed by teachers. This situation in turn gives rise to critical learning because students' judgements are attended to and reflected upon with interest and, in turn, students have to give an account of their reasons which would invariably be taken into systematic controversy by teachers and fellow students. In a different way, I find my students becoming more critical if I become attached to them-that is, their views are listened to with interest, appreciation and care. In turn, students expect to be corrected if their reasons cannot be justified. In this way, friendship is nurtured and the possibility of attending to the reasons of students in an atmosphere of respect and sharing would carry considerable weight.
Secondly, Sherman (1997, p. 208) argues that friendship involves people becoming mutually attuned to one another. In other words, they relax their boundaries and become stimulated by one another through argument. When students are teachers engage in argumentation on the basis that they relax their boundaries, it seems rather unlikely that their deliberations would result in hostile antagonism and conflicts which could potentially thwart their dialogical engagement. However, my potential critic might quite correctly claim that deliberative argumentation favours those students who are eloquent and that not all students could defensibly articulate their views. I agree, and for this reason I want to complement Sherman's idea of mutual attunement with Young's (1996) idea of listening to the stories of others, irrespective of whether these narratives are recounted in ways which do not attend to strict rules of argumentation. If teachers do so, the possibility of mutual attunement would further be enhanced. Failing to create spaces for inarticulate, noneloquent voices would not only exclude legitimate student voices from learning activities, but would also truncate critical learning-to openly and fairly evaluate the reasons of others, at the same time showing respect for others' points of view no matter how inarticulate these might be. I cannot imagine students becoming critical if they are prematurely excluded from learning on the grounds that they lack certain levels of articulation.
Thirdly, Sherman's idea of mutual action (1997, p. 212) to occur among teachers and students is in some ways linked to Arendt's (1998) notion of initiating students into new ways of doing. This means that when teachers teach they initiate students into new understandings and meanings not perhaps thought of before. Similarly, when students learn, they (de)construct meanings in ways which open up new possibilities for their learning. In this way, teaching and learning are continuous, because every initiative teachers and learners take is considered as opening up possibilities to see things anewthat is, meanings are always in the rendering the outcomes of education as inconclusive. What follows from such a view of teaching and learning is that the outcomes of education are always incomplete and the possibility of something new arising always seems to be present. Such a form of mutual action would give much hope for critical learning on the basis that such learning is connected to something new arising.
Sherman's idea of friendship as mutuality would invariably sustain democratic citizenship education, more specifically teaching and learning, for the reason that democratic citizenship education has in mind that teachers and students connect with one another, engage deliberatively through argument and narrative, and (de)construct meanings which are always inconclusive. However, such an account of friendship is not sufficient to ensure that teaching and learning remain critical. Why not? Mutual attachment can have the effect that teachers and students listen with interest and appreciation to one another; mutual attunement can create possibilities for deliberative engagement; and mutual action can ensure that the outcomes of education are inconclusive and the products of new initiatives. Yet, such forms of mutuality are not sufficient to ensure that teaching and learning are ongoing in the sense that new possibilities are opened up which can sustain criticality. For instance, when students learn to analyse, evaluate and modify arguments and judgements, the possibility exists that they abandon previously held preferences, opinions and views, and explore alternatives even if it means taking undue risks. Likewise, when teachers teach, they do not merely restrict their teaching to the achievement of expected or perhaps unexpected outcomes. This would mark the end of education, because teachers have not ventured far enough in pursuit of the unintended or the lucky find-that is, they have not taken sufficient risks and have thus limited their explorations. Such a situation in turn would also limit friendship, because the latter cannot last unless teachers have confidence in their students-friends-to take risks without knowing in advance what the outcomes might be-that is, without necessarily expecting something positive in return. It is for this reason that I am also attracted to the views of Derrida (1997) , who develops a conception of friendship which can contribute positively towards addressing some of the limitations of mutuality-in particular encouraging students to take risks.
Towards a Politics of Friendship
I shall now extend the idea of friendship as mutuality to a friendship of 'love' as found in the seminal thoughts of Derrida. Derrida (1997) raises the question of the positive contribution friendship can make in dialogue with others. For him, friendship is the act of loving (philia) rather than letting oneself be loved or being loved-what he refers to as inducing love (Derrida 1997, p. 8) . Of course, it is possible that one can be loved without knowing it. But it is impossible to love without knowing it. Derrida (1997, p. 9) makes the claim that 'the friend is the person who loves (and declares his or her love) before being the person who is loved'. And if one thinks friendship, one is to start with the 'friend-who-loves' not with the 'friend-who-is-loved' (Derrida 1997, p. 9) . Thus, when teachers and students consider themselves as friends, they willingly declare their love to one another to 'the limit of its possibility' (Derrida 1997, p. 12) . I feel myself loving my students when I care for them in a way that evokes their potentialities in order that they come up with possibilities I might not even have thought of. Without being affectionate towards them, I cultivate in them the capacity to reach their own justifiable conclusions to which they are to be held accountable by and to others-referred to by MacIntyre (1999, p. 83) as the ability to evaluate, modify or reject their own practical judgments. Only then can I consider myself as a 'friend-who-loves', since I do not expect being loved in return, that is, when students reach their own justifiable conclusions about educational issues, they do so without having to please me-without loving me in return. Similarly when students come up with sufficiently good reasons for acting and imagining alternative possibilities so as to be able to rationally re-educate themselves about educational issues without having to please me, they can be said to be 'friends-who-love'. It is this idea of friendship which can go some way towards achieving critical learning. Democratic Citizenship, Education and Friendship Revisited 201 Why? If I teach students, then I must first declare myself a 'friend-who-loves', since I would not to be loved in return. Fromm in The Art of Loving describes such a loving relationship as an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to others in the context in which they find themselves (Fromm 1957, p. 36) . In other words, loving relationships are 'brotherly' (sisterly) because they invoke a sense of responsibility, care and respect towards others (Fromm 1957, p. 37) . This would imply that as the teacher I should create conditions whereby students learn authentically, which requires that the following moves to be put in place: encouraging students to imagine situations in and beyond the parameters of their research interests, where things would be better-that is, to be caring towards students; democratising our interactions, whereby students can take the initiative to imagine possibilities not otherwise thought of-that is, to be responsible towards students; and connecting with students' storytelling with the aim of discovering untapped possibilities-that is, to be respectful towards students. So, a teacher not only connects with students, deliberates with them, and nurtures activities in ways that allow for outcomes not necessarily intended, but also establishes possibilities whereby students can come up with meanings which they (teachers) might not have expected. In other words, through their teaching, the possibility exists for students to come up with defensible meanings irrespective of what their teachers might want. In order for this to happen, students should be encouraged to take risks (as teachers' friends), because taking risks involves venturing into the unknown and unexpected, and from which unforeseen possibilities might arise. So, teachers who 'love' their students as friends are concerned that learning should result in unimagined possibilities-ways of doing which teachers had not perhaps thought of before, nor expect students to come up with. For instance, when a student learns, then the unexpected can be expected, that is, the student is capable of performing what is ''infinitely improbable'' (Arendt 1998, p. 178) . In doing so, a student not only announces what (s)he does, has done and intends to do, but also seeks to do the unexpected (Arendt 1998, p. 179) . One way of ensuring that one acts without knowing what to expect can be to stand back or detach oneself from one's own reasons and asking if others' reasons are in fact justifiable or not. One would not know what to expect if one sets out to evaluate, for instance, what one considers to be master texts. And when one evaluates these texts (through engaging in systematic controversy with them), one would invariably set out to revise one's own reasons, or abandon them, or replace them with other unexpected reasons (MacIntyre 1999, p. 91) . In this way, one detaches oneself from one's own reasons to revise or abandon them in the light of what others with whom one engages-in this case, the authors of texts-have to say. MacIntyre (1999, p. 96) argues that we come to know when we are able not just to evaluate our reasons as better or worse, but also when we detach ourselves from the immediacy of our own desires in order to 'imagine alternative realistic futures' which might give rise to unexpected results. This implies that it would be inconceivable to read texts as master works which should not be engaged with and not standing back from one's rational judgements about what one's understanding of these texts is. Detaching oneself from one's own reasons in relation to one's evaluation of texts suggests that these texts cannot be dealt with uncritically or as uncontroversial. The mere fact that one acts through evaluation and detachment brings into question the underlying assumptions of texts that one reads and analyses. Only then can the unexpected be anticipated, which suggests that only then is one acting-and learning.
Thus far, I have argued that critical teaching and learning can best be achieved by means of mutuality and love-more specifically complementary forms of friendship. These forms of friendship have in mind what democratic citizenship education sets out to achieve: taking risks to cultivate sharing, deliberative engagement and the recognition that others' rights have to be respected. I shall now explore how such a notion of friendship can bring about democratic justice in relation to teaching and learning.
Demoratic Justice-a Valuable Good of Friendship
Gutmann (2003) gives a compelling account of democratic justice, which I argue can be achieved through friendship in teaching and learning. For Gutmann (2003, pp. 26-27) democratic justice involves three interrelated aspects: the capacity to live one's own life as one sees fit consistent with respecting equal freedoms of others-'to treat all individuals as equal agents'; the capacity to contribute to the justice of one's society and one's world; and the capacity of individuals to live a decent life with a fair chance to choose among their preferred ways of living. Firstly, if one learns to respect the liberties of others as being equally as important as one's own, then one recognises that others have similar freedoms to live their lives according to what they see fit. So, when South African students are taught to respect the freedoms of other students (say from their neighbouring countries or from communities that are different from their own), they do not become agitated when others present points of view perhaps different from theirs-they respect the views of others. However, this does not mean that they necessarily agree with everything others have to say. They also have the right to question, undermine and refute the judgements of others. At least the possibility of learning is there when students begin to critically scrutinise one another's views in an atmosphere of mutual respect for one another's different or at times conflicting judgements. When students respect one another equally, they are said to be critical, because criticality demands that we give due consideration to the views of others. A group of students once came to me to express their inability to grasp some of the key concepts in the philosophy of education. When I told the other students about this in the classroom, they became agitated with the group (not necessarily homogenous in terms of race and culture), because they claimed that these students had no legitimate grounds to claim ignorance of the subject. I felt the majority of students were wrong to be dismissive of the group, because one aspect of critical learning is that we begin to connect with students who might encounter some difficulty in getting to understand aspects of the course-a matter of nurturing friendships. In this regard, equally respecting the rights of others in order to gain some understanding of what appear to be difficult concepts to grasp amounts to recognising that others have a legitimate voice which needs to be heard. Only then would the possibility of critical learning be enhanced. In this way, learning to recognise different and often conflicting judgements of others seems to be a way in which to maximise critical learning. This is so because critical learning has some connection with considering the merit of the conflicting views of others-that is, whether these views make sense.
Secondly, to learn how to contribute to the justice of one's society and the world has some connection with critical learning. I remember a student who remarked that living in poverty is a choice which some people prefer to exercise. (This student specifically referred to the majority of Blacks who live in squalor and abject poverty in informal settlements, better known as squatter camps in South Africa.) If the student meant that some people are poor and therefore have little choice to determine where they live, then I agree with him. And, if he meant (and I presume this is the case) that some people are poor and cannot afford to improve their living conditions, I also agree. But if he means that we should not be doing something (whether through protests or other means) about improving their precarious living conditions, then I disagree. In other words, one cannot claim to be a Democratic Citizenship, Education and Friendship Revisited 203 critical learner if one's learning does not result in some form of action which can potentially contribute towards the achievement of democratic justice. I cannot imagine how students could be critical if their learning does not cause them to act anew-they need to act with a sense of justice to others. Likewise, students cannot be critical if their learning does not contribute towards their advocating for a just world-for instance, the reduction of extreme and unacceptable levels of poverty on the African continent. This does not mean that they merely call for recognition and respect of other's rights (whether civil, political and social) within a critical learning agenda. Instead, they also stress the importance of taking responsibility for the rights of others-a matter of taking others' rights seriously or 'accepting appropriate responsibility for the rights of others, not just making a fuss about our own' (Callan 1997, p. 73) . For instance, people who champion the right to employment in South Africa also consider as important the cause of others to take responsibility to meet the needs of those who are jobless. Such an understanding of justice could potentially extend the mere recognition of, and respect for, other's rights to a position whereby we assume appropriate responsibility for the rights of others as friends. Thirdly, to learn what it means to be decent or civil (to be democratically just) has some connection to being critical. To show civility involves demonstrating what Macedo (1990) refers to as a sense of 'public-spiritedness'-that is, demonstrating a conscious awareness of others and recognising that they have to be respected on account of their difference. In South African university classrooms there are students from various cultural backgrounds and, when these students demonstrate civility, they connect with one another's stories. They are acutely aware of one another's differences and through their 'public-spiritedness' collectively share the stories of their lives. That is, they are critical. However, encountering one another's difference does not mean that one merely listens to what others have to say without subjecting their truth claims to critical scrutiny. These students also question one another's stories with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the texts of their lived experiences. I recall one student in my philosophy of education class who questioned another student's bias towards Muslims in general. One student claimed that Muslims are bigots, whereas another student disagreed with this view on the basis that she lived in a Muslim country and her experience was that Muslims are generally moderate and respectful towards others (like herself) who have different cultural backgrounds. The point I am making is that questioning and undermining the views of others does not necessarily mean that one is disrespectful towards others. Rather, critically questioning people's unjustifiable assumptions about others is to treat them with honour, that is, not considering the unjustifiable views of others as 'beyond the pale of critical judgement' (Fay 1996) . In this way, one demonstrates a sense of decency (civility)-one is democratically just and therefore critical.
In essence, when students learn about democratic justice, they learn to recognise equally the freedoms of others, to contribute towards private and public justice, and to be decent. In this way, they learn to be critical because criticality is linked to the realisation of a democratically just society on the grounds of having been exposed beforehand to texts which may enhance the possibility of achieving democratic justice. Yet learning about democratic justice cannot take place in university classrooms without teachers and students acting as friends. It is to a consideration of this issue that I now turn.
I have shown that cultivating friendship through mutuality and love can contribute towards students taking risks. And if students are prepared to take risks, then the possibility exists for them to engage with the commonalities and differences of others. In this way, friendship makes urgent the task of creating democratic citizens who share a sufficiently cohesive identity. Put differently, teachers and students acting as friends would honour 'the sources of diversity that thrive within the boundaries of a strong common citizenship, and yet supports a judicious tolerance to ways of life that conflict with some of its demands'. The pursuit of a collective identity without discounting the differences of others could do much to prevent ethnic hatred and religious intolerance (Callan 1997, p. 221) . My focus is preventing ethnic hatred and religious intolerance. (South) Africa's past history has been marred by ethnic violence and religious bigotry-Zulus fighting with Xhosas, and Afrikaners resenting English-speaking peoples in South Africa, Muslims and non-Muslims attacking and hurting one another in Nigeria, and the Zimbabwean government confiscating White farmers' properties and evicting them. It is here that teaching and learning along the lines of friendship (through taking risks) can provide enabling conditions for democratic justice, more specifically pursuing a pathway of collective political identity. This implies that university teachers should not merely listen to narratives of students, but actually encourage a spirit of living together in diversity-that is, through dialogical action university teachers and students should together establish dialogical opportunities which take into account people's linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious commonalities and diversities. The idea of finding a dialogical space for the sharing of different people's commonalities is based on the understanding that people need to learn to live with the otherness of others whose ways of being may be deeply threatening to our own. And, by creating a dialogical space, referred to by Benhabib (2002, p. 127) as 'intercultural dialogue', whereby people can enact what they have in common and at the same time make public their competing narratives and significations, people might have a real opportunity to co-exist. In this way they would not only establish a community of conversation and interdependence (that is, they share commonalities), but also one of disagreement (that is, they do not share commonalities) without disrespecting others' life-worlds (Benhabib 2002, pp. 35 and 41) . Put differently, when teachers and students are engaged in a conversation underpinned by interdependence and disagreement (albeit with risks), they engage in friendship with a collective identity-they share commonalities and differences so vital to the realisation of democratic justice.
Moreover, taking risks would evoke in teachers and students the capacity to confront one another through deliberation. For Callan the idea of deliberation is not an attempt 'to achieve dialogical victory over our adversaries, but rather the attempt to find and enact terms of political coexistence that we and they can reasonably endorse as morally acceptable' (Callan 1997, p. 215) . Through deliberation, teachers and students disturb doubts about the correctness of their moral beliefs or about the importance of the differences between what they and others believe (a matter of arousing distress) accompanied by a rough process of struggle and ethical confrontation-that is, belligerence (Callan 1997, p. 211) . If this happens, belligerence and distress give way eventually to moments of ethical conciliation, when the truth and error in rival positions have been made clear and a fitting synthesis of factional viewpoints is achieved (Callan 1997, p. 212) ; this is an idea of deliberation-with which I agree-where no one has the right to silence dissent and where participants can speak their minds. And when teachers and students can speak their minds, they are also prepared to take risks which would place them favourably in relation to effecting justice in their society. Teachers and students who are prepared to challenge forms of injustice such as poverty and racism in their society do so for the sake of achieving democratic justice-they act as friends willing to take the risk of speaking their minds.
Finally, taking risks as friends does not merely call for recognition and respect of other's rights (whether civil, political and social), but also taking responsibility for the rights of others. Taking rights seriously means 'accepting appropriate responsibility for the rights of others, not just making a fuss about our own' (Callan 1997, p. 73) . For instance, people who champion the right to employment in their countries also consider as important the cause of others to take responsibility to meet the needs of those who are jobless. Acting responsibly as friends would instil in teachers and students qualities which can help to build a better country-one free from social oppression (drug and alcohol abuse, gangsterism and human rights abuses), economic marginalisation (unemployment is rife among the majority of the previously disadvantaged) and subtle forms of racist exclusion (the most lucrative jobs are still occupied by those who were privileged in the past). The point is that unless universities become havens of friendship aimed at producing a better future for all people, we cannot seriously engage with challenges of the unexpected.
